Met chief tried to stop De Menezes inquiry

Sir Ian Blair refused to resign yesterday after the official report into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes criticised the Metropolitan Police Commissioner for attempting to stop the independent investigation of the shooting. The report also found the force had committed "very serious" and "avoidable" mistakes.

The 168-page document by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) detailing its six-month investigation into the death of the 27-year-old Brazilian revealed that criminal charges, including murder, were considered against 15 officers involved in the botched operation.

Prosecutors looked at but rejected bringing murder charges against the two firearms officers who – between them – shot seven bullets into the head and face of Mr de Menezes. The prosecutors also considered an allegation of gross negligence against Deputy Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick, who was the "gold commander" in charge of the operation and gave a potentially ambiguous order for a "stop" to be carried out on the Brazilian electrician.

The report highlighted a succession of unresolved questions surrounding the shooting at Stockwell Tube station in south London on 22 July 2005, including the insistence from eight officers that a warning of "armed police" was shouted to Mr de Menezes before he was killed. None of the 17 civilian witnesses in the carriage recalled hearing any such warning.

Outlining 16 improvements and changes to the way the Metropolitan Police operates, the IPCC called for a full public debate on Scotland Yard's "shoot-to-kill" policy, Operation Kratos, under which armed police can be ordered to kill – with shots to the head – a suspected suicide bomber who they believe is about to detonate a device.

The Stockwell One report said there was now "doubt" among police about the Kratos procedure. It also revealed the existence of a second policy, Operation C, under which a police sniper can be ordered to take a "critical shot" at a bomber in a crowd at a public event.

The watchdog was also scathing in its criticism of Sir Ian for attempting to block its investigators from beginning an inquiry into the shooting because he wanted to ensure the anti-terrorist operation to find the failed 21 July bombers, who had tried set off rucksack bombs the day before Mr de Menezes's death, was unimpeded. Nick Hardwick, the IPCC chairman, said: "The commissioner attempted to prevent us carrying out an investigation. In my view, much of the unavoidable difficulty the Stockwell incident has caused the Metropolitan Police arose from the delay in referral."

Sir Ian has faced down a succession of demands for his resignation, including a vote of no confidence by the London Assembly, since his force was found guilty at the Old Bailey last week and fined £175,000 for endangering the public with a series of "fundamental failures" during the 22 July operation.

The 54-year-old commissioner said the IPCC report, which was delivered to the Yard 18 months ago but remained unpublished until the conclusion of the Old Bailey trial, showed "some mistakes and miscommunications" had led to a "disastrous result" but his force had made significant changes to its procedures.

Sir Ian, Britain's most senior policeman, said: "I intend to remain in this post. My reasoning is very simple. By the very nature of its task, the history of the Metropolitan Police Service is littered with controversial events. Commissioners have to be in post for enough time to drive long-term change. They have not previously widely been expected to resign over individual incidents, however grave.

"I repeat my deep and very personal regret for the death of Jean Charles de Menezes. However, I have been entrusted with the long-term development of the Metropolitan Police."

Five unanswered questions

* Why did eight police officers give statements that the words "armed police" were shouted in warning to Jean Charles de Menezes when none of the 17 civilian witnesses heard those words?

* Why did Cressida Dick, the gold commander, not clarify her order to armed officers to "stop" Mr de Menezes by making it clear that the Operation Kratos "shoot to kill" policy had not been invoked?

* How did control room commanders form the firm belief that Mr de Menezes had been positively identified as Hussein Osman, a fugitive suicide bomber, and was "very, very jumpy" when none of the surveillance officers pursuing him had given that confirmation?

* Why did the two officers who shot Mr de Menezes both say in statements 36 hours after the shooting that he was wearing a "bulky denim jacket" when he was not?

* Who was responsible for the delay in getting an armed response team to Mr de Menezes's home?